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This paper develops a simple dynamic stochastic general equi- 
librium model with collateral constraints to explore the business 
cycle implications of financial leverage. From the model-based ex- 
periments, the degree of leverage is shown to be an important factor 
in amplifying the effects of collateral constraints. This finding sug- 
gests that financial leverage may affect the real economy in non- 
neutral ways in the course of business fluctuations. Moreover, in- 
stead of the interactions between investment and collateral price, 
the endogenous accumulation of collateral asset is shown to be an 
alternative channel through which the business cycle effects of the 
collateral constraints are generated. From the model simulations, 
we find it difficult to have both significant amplification and sig- 
nificant persistence at the same time. This is due to the different 
response patterns of investment and consumption, which are con- 
sistent with the intertemporal optimizing behaviors.
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I. Introduction
Before the recent global financial turmoil unfolded, financial industries 
worldwide pursued high profits by significantly expanding leverage. In- 
vesting on margin, leveraged buyouts, or trading of highly leveraged 
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derivative products was a usual and widespread practice. After ob- 
serving the current global financial crisis, a natural question emerges: 
Is there any structural modeling framework that can systematically ex- 
plain the aggregate implications of highly leveraged financial sector?
Unfortunately, the conventional RBC model as well as the textbook 
IS-LM model treat the financial structure as irrelevant under the as- 
sumption of a perfect capital market, as documented by Bernanke, Gertler, 
and Gilchrist (1999). The recent developments in the field, which improve 
upon this irrelevance assumption, have explicitly introduced credit mar- 
ket imperfections into the dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) 
model. There are at least two distinct modeling approaches in intro- 
ducing credit market imperfections. The first one assumes that the out- 
come of investment projects is costly for lenders to observe as in, inter 
alia, Bernanke and Gertler (1989). The second one assumes that bor- 
rowers cannot precommit to produce due to the inalienability of human 
capital as in, inter alia, Kiyotaki and Moore (1997).
The goal of this paper is to devise a simple DSGE model to inves- 
tigate the short-run business cycle effects of financial leverage. More 
concretely, following the line of research after Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), 
this paper develops a computable variant of credit cycle model that re- 
veals the mechanism through which leverage in borrowing constraints 
affects the level of amplification and persistence of business fluctuations. 
The model is presented in its form as simple as possible without any 
other friction such as nominal stickiness to avoid any complication. 
The application of an abstract model in this paper is intended to en- 
hance its clarity in explaining the dynamics despite its lack of empiri- 
cal flavor.
In the modeling perspectives, one of the features of the present paper 
distinct from the existing credit cycle literature, such as Kiyotaki and 
Moore (1997), Cordoba and Ripoll (2004a), and Iacoviello and Minetti 
(2006) to name a few, is that it introduces the concept of leverage into 
collateral constraints. The question is whether the total amount of bor- 
rowing should be less than or equal to the total amount of the real 
asset collateral in the setup of the model. In the existing models, the 
former is assumed not to exceed the latter. However, relaxing this as- 
sumption, that is, introducing leverage against collateral in the model, 
appeals to observations of the financial industry today. The industry 
has developed ways to stretch the supply of credit given the limits in 
real asset collateral. This development has opened the door for highly 
leveraged finances. In reality, the amount of collateral constrains the 
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amount of borrowing but possibly not in a one-to-one fashion. Securiti- 
zation is an example. The underlying real asset directly backing mortgage 
also backs, indirectly but effectively, the MBS backed by the mortgage 
and the CDO backed by the MBS. In essence, securitization can be 
considered a way of making the underlying collateral perform double- 
duty. Other examples may include short-selling and margin trading, where 
one can trade a huge amount of notional principal while devoting none 
or only a small fraction of it.
The aggregate data are also consistent with these financial-side 
evolutions. In the US, the average ratio of total debt outstanding (from 
the flow of funds accounts) to the net stock of fixed assets (from NIPA 
tables) have not been restricted below unity. The ratio of borrowing to 
fixed assets has exceeded 1 since 1999. This indicates that the amount 
of borrowing is affected not only by the amount of collateral but also 
by the degree of leverage reflecting the contemporary financial tech- 
nology. In this respect, the aggregate data seem to support the intro- 
duction of leverage into the collateral constraints. To make leveraging 
against collateral theoretically feasible in the model, this paper introduces 
two assumptions: (1) a certain type of transaction cost is incurred in 
the process of recovery as in Iacoviello (2005) and Mendicino (2008), 
and (2) the commitment of the borrower to produce is limited in its 
effectiveness. Under these assumptions, the ratio of borrowing to col- 
lateral can either be bigger or smaller than 1.
Other than the “leverage” interpretation, what makes the present 
paper distinct from the previous credit cycle literature is that it proposes 
a different channel through which the business cycle effects of the col- 
lateral constraints are generated. In the literature, the “two-way” inter- 
action between investment and collateral price has been focused on as 
a candidate mechanism that generates amplification and persistence that 
the conventional RBC models cannot reproduce. It should be noted that 
in modeling these two-way interactions, the existing studies assume 
the supply of collateral assets to be perfectly inelastic, abstracting from 
the endogenous accumulation of collateral assets. However, even nar- 
rowly defined capital, such as plant and equipment, certainly serves 
well as collateral in the real world. There is no need to assume that 
collateral assets are in a fixed supply. Notably, the rational economic 
agents who face borrowing constraints may have motive for accumu- 
lating collateral assets to expand borrowing capacity in anticipation of 
future needs. Until now, this endogenous motive for capital accumula- 
tion has been ignored, and its implications in generating credit cycle 
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effects have not been properly studied. The present paper shuts off the 
two-way interaction channel and instead proposes the endogenous col- 
lateral accumulation as an alternative channel. This paper shows evi- 
dently that the effects of financial leverage can be generated through 
the workings of this alternative channel.
To examine the business cycle implications of leveraging against col- 
lateral, the numerical analysis in this paper raises the following ques- 
tions: If the leverage in the collateral constraints is possibly non-neutral 
to business cycle characteristics, how does it matter? If two otherwise 
homogeneous economies differ only in the degree of leverage, how do 
some of the important business cycle moments of these two economies 
differ? How are they affected by the different levels of financial lever- 
age? To answer these questions properly, this paper designs a compar- 
ative study that focuses on the differences in the magnitudes of ampli- 
fication and the persistence of business fluctuations simulated from 
different degrees of leverage while controlling for other things being equal.
The key implication of the financial leverage revealed from the ex- 
periments in this paper is that in a highly leveraged economy, the 
effects of shocks are likely to appear in amplified magnitudes but do 
not persist longer than in the economy with low leverage. This is con- 
sistent with the two-fold findings from the impulse-response analyses 
as noted below. The following two findings jointly imply that the more 
highly leveraged the economy is in the bigger amplitude, investment 
deviates from its steady-state, and in the smaller amplitude, consump- 
tion deviates from its steady-state, resulting in larger amplification and 
smaller persistence.
(1) The response patterns of investment and consumption to a positive 
total factor productivity (TFP) impulse are in stark contrast. The magni- 
tude of the responses of investment is much larger than that of con- 
sumption. In this respect, investment is a key driver of amplification. 
Consumption exhibits stronger persistence. Consumption expands with 
income in the process of capital accumulation (income effect), but more 
resources may be allocated to lending rather than consumption, taking 
advantage of the high productivity (substitution effect). The interactions 
of these two effects yield hump-shaped responses, implying that con- 
sumption is a more important determinant of persistence than invest- 
ment.
(2) Higher leverage is associated with stronger responses of investment 
and weaker responses of consumption to a positive shock. When the 
level of financial leverage is higher, the benefits from the enlarging bor- 
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rowing capacity due to increase in investment are larger. This yields a 
stronger substitution effect, shifting more resources from consumption 
to investment. This substitution appears weaker when only a lower level 
of leveraging is allowed.
The results of the model simulations, being largely consistent with 
the findings from the impulse-response analyses, can be summarized 
as follows. Amplification increases in the degree of leverage, whereas 
persistence decreases in the degree of leverage. Moreover, the sizable 
amplification emerges only with significantly high leverage, whereas 
persistence generated by the present model appears to be quantitatively 
insignificant. However, the present model can be argued to improve the 
one in Cordoba and Ripoll (2004a) in that the experiments based on 
the present model generate bigger and better amplification results even 
if the effects from collateral price changes were not included.
This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 lays out the model. 
Section 3 studies the model’s quantitative implications, and Section 4 
presents the conclusion. 
II. The Model
A. Economic Environment
The model economy is a discrete-time, infinite-horizon economy pop- 
ulated by two types of agents, households and entrepreneurs. For sim- 
plification in aggregation, we assume each to be of a continuum of unit 
mass.
a) The Representative Household














E c ,                       (1)
where E0 denotes the expectation based on time-0 information, 0＜β＜1 
is the discount factor, ct’ is the consumption in the period t, and lt’ are 
hours of work in the period t. The parameter η  governs the labor 
supply elasticity.
The household faces the following budget constraint:
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− −′ ′ ′ ′+ ⋅ = ⋅ +1 1t t t t t tc r b w l b ,                     (2)
where wt is the wage rate per hour, bt’ is the amount of borrowing in 
period t, and rt－1 is the gross rate of interest determined in period t－1 
to be paid in t. All the relative prices, such as wt and rt－1, are 
expressed in terms of consumption good, which is the numeraire in 
this model economy. Note also that bt’ takes on negative values when 
the household saves or lends.
b) The Representative Entrepreneur
The representative entrepreneur is assumed to have an instantaneous 








E c ,                            (3)
where ct denotes consumption in the period t, and 0＜γ＜1 is the 
discount factor. The ex ante heterogeneity in the subjective discount 
rates between the entrepreneur and household facilitates the credit flows 
in this model economy and departs from the unconstrained optimum. 
We assume γ＜β  for the purposes to be discussed later.1





1t t t ty z k l ,                           (4)
where kt is the capital stock in the period t, lt employment, zt is TFP, 
yt is the amount of outputs, and α  is the capital share. Capital stock 
evolves via the law of motion given by:
δ −= − ⋅ +1(1 )t t tk k i ,                        (5)
where it denotes real gross investment in t and 0＜δ＜1 depreciation 
rate.
1 If the entrepreneur is patient enough to save much, then the borrowing 
constraint does not necessarily bind. The assumption of γ＜β ensures the 
borrowing constraint to bind in the neighborhood of the steady state, as will 
become clear later.
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Other than the technological constraints of (4) and (5), the entre- 
preneur faces the following budget constraint:
− −+ + ⋅ = − ⋅ +1 1t t t t t t t tc i r b y w l b ,                      (6)
where bt is the amount of borrowing in the period t.
From (5) and (6), the relative price of capital in terms of consump- 
tion good is assumed to be constant and one-for-one. In the existing 
literature, the interaction between investment and collateral asset price 
is focused on the candidate mechanism that generates amplification 
and persistence that the conventional RBC models cannot reproduce. 
That interaction is considered not uni-directional but rather “two-way.” 
However, if we define capital broadly as the only tangible productive 
asset, the price of collateral is nothing but Tobin’s q. Tobin’s q should 
then deviate from unity to generate the credit cycle effects. Suppressing 
the possible deviations in the relative price of collateral, this paper es- 
sentially shuts off the so-called “two-way interactions” between asset 
prices and real quantities. As documented earlier in this paper, the 
existing literature usually models these two-way interactions by assum- 
ing a fixed supply of collateral asset. For example, Iacoviello (2005) in- 
troduced a fixed amount of real estate endowments for collateral while 
assuming capital not to be collateralizable. However, in the real world, 
capital itself functions as collateral, and the quantity of collateral assets 
cannot be assumed to be merely in a fixed supply.
It should be noted that because the aggregate amount of collateral 
asset does not vary, the endogenous motive for dynamic accumulation 
of collateral assets is ignored, and its implications in the business fluc- 
tuations have not been properly studied until now. However, the rational 
economic agents who face borrowing constraints may have motive to 
accumulate collateral assets to expand borrowing capacity. This paper 
is distinct from the existing literature in that it tries to capture the role 
of endogenous capital/collateral accumulation in generating the credit 
cycle effects.2
2 In this sense, shutting off the two-way interaction channel in this paper is 
an intentional modeling choice to some extent. This paper does not try to com- 
pare the relative significance of the two different channels. This paper does not 
assert the dominance of the alternative channel over the two-way interaction 
channel at all. Thus, to construct more general model nesting, both channels 
are not required here.
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Another critical feature of the model economy is that producers, as 
most likely borrowers, cannot precommit to produce fully efficiently, in 
the sense that the output produced may be strictly below the produc- 
tion possibilities frontier. Producers may choose to exert a low level of 
effort in utilizing factors of production, idling in some or simply ab- 
sconding or walking away from the contracts and leaving behind their 
undepreciated assets and inefficient amount of output. This partial com- 
mitment for the producers due to their inalienability of human capital 
(Hart and Moore 1994) or moral hazard problem requires the collater- 
alization of the asset holdings of the borrower.
The present model shares the assumption of this lack of commit- 
ment with other credit cycle models such as Kiyotaki and Moore (1997). 
What distinguishes the present model is that it assumes partial com- 
mitment, not noncommitment per se. In the other models where non- 
commitments are assumed, producers can leave behind only the col- 
lateral asset without any output produced. The amount of borrowing 
cannot exceed the value of the collateral. In Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), 
Kiyotaki (1998), Cordoba and Ripoll (2004a, 2004b), or Pintus and Wen 
(2008), the former equals the latter, whereas in Kiyotaki and Moore 
(2005, 2008), Iacoviello (2005), Song (2005), Iacoviello and Minetti (2006), 
or Mendicino (2008), the former is the fraction of the latter due to the 
liquidity characteristics or the existence of a certain type of transaction 
cost in the process of recovery.3
In this paper, the amount of borrowing is allowed to exceed the 
amount of collateral. Why does the assumption of θ＜1 need to be 
relaxed? How can it be justified to introduce leverage in the collateral 
constraints? Casual observations indicate that there are heavy volumes 
of unsecured corporate bonds trading that are backed purely by cash- 
flows without requiring collateral assets. Furthermore, finding cases 
where the value of collateral posted falls short of the amount of bor- 
rowing is not difficult under the condition that the borrower has other 
sources of repayments. However, this is not the entire story.
Allowing the total amount of borrowing to exceed that of collateral, 
that is, introducing leverage into the model, appeals to observations 
from the recent financial industry. The industry has expanded leverage 
significantly in the pursuit of high profits. Faced with limits in real 
asset collateral, the industry has developed ways to stretch the supply 
3 Kiyotaki and Moore (1997, p. 221 footnote 10) already point out the need to 
consider transaction cost in the course of repossession by creditors.
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of credit. This development has facilitated opportunities for highly lev- 
eraged finances. Investing on margin, leveraged buyouts, or derivative 
trades has become the usual practice. That famous global investment 
banks invest 30 to 60 times their equities is a well-known fact. Securi- 
tization is an example of a method of making underlying collateral per- 
form double-duty. Other examples may include shortselling and margin 
trading. For instance, in Korea, holding 40% of the stocks to be sold 
short was permissible. This implies that about 2.5 times of the under- 
lying stock holdings could be traded. In countries where the so-called 
“naked” short-selling is permitted, one does not even have to hold the 
stocks to sell at all. In case of derivative trading such as futures, one 
can trade huge amounts of notional principal while devoting only a small 
amount of margin requirements.4
The question then is whether these environmental changes in finan- 
cial technology are neutral to the patterns or characteristics of business 
fluctuations. If they are non-neutral, the question becomes how their 
effects can be explained and characterized in the DSGE framework.   
In dealing with these questions, this paper builds a computable DSGE 
model as simple as possible to obtain meaningful qualitative business 
cycle implications of financial leverage. This necessitates relaxing the 
assumption of θ≤1.
The aggregate data appear to support the introduction of leverage 
into collateral constraints. As shown in Figure 1, in the US, the average 
ratio of year-end total debt outstanding to the year-end net stock of 
fixed assets stood at 1.09 for the years 2000-2008. This fact implies 
that the amount of borrowing is affected not only by the amount of col- 
lateral but also by the degree of leverage reflecting contemporary finan- 
cial technology.5
4 Park (2009) provides an interesting characterization on the relationship 
between financial development and crisis.
5 Assuming that the aggregate stock of a collateral limits the aggregate value 
of borrowing does not appear to be very realistic. In reality, the amount of 
physical assets cannot and do not limit the enlargement of financial sectors in 
the economy. The World Bank data show that in the years 2000-2004, the ratio 
of the total market value of listed stocks and bonds relative to GDP on average 
amounted to 2.87 in the U.S. and 3.02 in Switzerland. It is not a surprise at all 
that adding the values of all the other financial claims, that is, the reasonable 
estimates for the fair value of bank loans, derivatives, and other unlisted finan- 
cial products, can increase the ratio relative to GDP much higher than around 
3 in some countries. Roughly speaking, if the steady state marginal product of 
capital net of depreciation equals about 8%, and capital income share amounts 
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FIGURE 1
RATIO OF BORROWING TO COLLATERAL IN THE US6
To make leveraging against collateral technically feasible in the model, 
the present paper introduces two assumptions: (1) a certain type of 
transaction cost is incurred in the process of recovery as in Iacoviello 
(2005) and Mendicino (2008), and (2) the commitment of the borrower 
to produce is limited in its effectiveness. The original model of Kiyotaki 
and Moore (1997) is built on the assumption that there is lack of com- 
mitment. Under noncommitment, clearly the amount of borrowing cannot 
exceed the amount of collateral. Hence, if the recovery costs are addi- 
tionally incurred, the ratio of the former to the latter should be strictly 
to about 0.3, then the capital-output ratio in the steady state should be around 
2½. As capital is 2½ times larger than the output in the steady state, if the ratio 
of financial claims to GDP is much higher than 3, then the ratio of financial 
claims to capital is much higher than 1.
6 Data sources: The numerator is calculated based on the Flow of Funds 
Accounts D. 3 Debt Outstanding by Sector (Domestic nonfinancial sectors total 
plus Domestic financial sectors plus foreign). The denominator is from the 
National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA) All Fixed Asset Tables, Table 1.1. 
Current-Cost Net Stock of Fixed Assets and Consumer Durable Goods (Fixed 
Assets Private plus Government). It is evident that the ratio of borrowing to 
collateral has evolved in the process of financial development and appears to be 
related mainly to the low-frequency component of macroeconomic variables. The 
ratio θ as a parameter in the model setup is assumed to be rationalized on this 
basis, as the present paper focuses on high-frequency business cycle issues.
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smaller than 1. However, why cannot we assume partial commitment 
instead of noncommitment? Under partial commitment, borrowers can 
commit to produce partially, and then they do not have to pledge col- 
lateral as much as or more than the amount they borrow because there 
are still some positive amount of output produced left behind even when 
they ultimately walk out of the contract. They can provide lenders with 
collateral amounting to only a fraction of their borrowing, that is, the 
amount of borrowing net of the amount of output left that will be pro- 
duced. Hence, under partial commitment, if there are no recovery costs 
to be incurred, the ratio of borrowing to collateral should be strictly 
greater than 1. In contrast, under the assumptions of both recovery 
costs and partial commitment, the ratio of borrowing to collateral can 
be either greater or smaller than 1.
In the model economy, there is only one type of collateral asset, that 
is, capital. Thus, the amount of borrowing should be subject to the 
following borrowing constraint:7
θ δ⋅ ≤ ⋅ − ⋅(1 )t t tr b k ,                       (7a)
where θ＞0 denotes the ratio of maximum leverage allowable. It is note- 









r b the amount of borrowing
k the amount of collateral
B. Competitive Equilibrium
A competitive equilibrium of the model economy is defined as a se- 
quence of capital stock, output, consumption of the entrepreneur, con- 
sumption of the household, hours of work, net borrowing of the en- 
trepreneur, rate of interest, wage rate, and the lagrange multiplier with 
respect to collateralized borrowing constraint, {kt, yt, ct, ct’, lt, bt, rt, wt, 
λ t}, respectively, which satisfies the following properties for every t:
1. Each household chooses {ct’, lt’, bt’} optimally, given {rt, wt}.
2. Each entrepreneur chooses {kt, ct, lt, bt} optimally, given {rt, wt}.
7 There is no uncertainty on the right-hand side. This makes the occurrence 
of the event of the default impossible; thus, the external finance premium or 
default premium becomes irrelevant in this model.
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3. The markets for goods, labor, and credit are clear.
′= + + ,t t t ty c c i                           (8)
′= ,t tl l                               (9)
′+ = 0.t tb b                            (10)
a) Characterization of Optimizing Behaviors
In a competitive equilibrium, the representative household maximizes 
(1) subject to (2), and the representative entrepreneur maximizes (3) 
subject to both (6) and (7a), while all the relevant markets are clear in 
accordance with (8), (9), and (10).
The optimization behavior of the household can be characterized as 
the following first-order necessary conditions.
















c c                       
 (12)
Next, the optimization behavior of the entrepreneur can be character- 
ized as the following first-order conditions:
( )αγ δ λ θ δ+
+
⎡ ⎤⎛ ⎞⋅= ⋅ + − + ⋅ ⋅ −⎢ ⎥⎜ ⎟




1 1 1 1 ,t t
t t t
yE
c c k           
(13)













1 .t t t
t t
rE r
c c                        
(15)
From the steady-state version of (12) and (15), respectively,
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β = 1 ,
r                              
(12sa)
γ λ= + ⋅1 ,c
r                           
(15sa)
it follows that the lagrange multiplier should be positive in the neigh- 
borhood of the steady state due to the assumption of γ＜β ,
β γλ −= > 0,
c                            
(16)
which in turn implies that the borrowing constraint (7a) always binds 
in the neighborhood of the steady state.
θ δ⋅ = ⋅ − ⋅(1 ) .t t tr b k                         (7b)








1 1 1 .
t t t
E
c r c                        
 (17)
The left-hand side of the Inequality (17) is the discounted marginal 
utility of borrowing, whereas the right-hand side is the present value of 
its expected marginal disutility from paying back. Thus, the exact in- 
terpretation of the lagrange multiplier λ t is the degree with which the 
marginal benefit of borrowing exceeds the marginal cost or, in other 
words, the marginal value of borrowing.
Now from the Equation (13),
αγ γ δ+
+ +
⎡ ⎤⎛ ⎞⋅− ⋅ > ⋅ −⎢ ⎥⎜ ⎟




1 1 1 .t
t t t t
yE E
c c c k             
(18)
The left-hand side of the Inequality (18) is the expected opportunity 
cost or user cost of holding additional capital in terms of utility, whereas 
the right-hand side is the present value of the expected utility from the 
net marginal product of capital. The gap between the left-hand and right- 
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hand sides amounts to
λ θ δ⋅ ⋅ − >(1 ) 0.t                        (19)
Note that the benefit of holding capital is twofold. The right-hand side 
of (18) is one component. The other component, (19), is the benefit of 
having more collateral and therefore being allowed to borrow more. One 
unit of capital that the entrepreneur has can serve as collateral for up 
to θ (1－δ) units, and thus the benefit of having additional capital in 
terms of utility is given by λ tθ (1－δ).
b) Characterization of the Steady State Equilibrium
The steady state is defined as a set of endogenous variables {k, y, c, 
c’, i, l, b, r, w, λ }, which satisfy the following conditions:
′ − ⋅ = ⋅ − ,c r b w l b                       (2ss)
α α−= ⋅ ⋅ 1 ,y z k l                        (4ss)
δ= ⋅ ,i k                           (5ss)
+ + ⋅ = − ⋅ + ,c i r b y w l b                   (6ss)









c c                         
(12ss)
( )γ α δ λθ δ⋅⎛ ⎞= + − + −⎜ ⎟
⎝ ⎠
1 1 1 ,y
c c k                 
(13ss)
( )α− ⋅= 1 ,yw
l                         
(14ss)
γ λ⎛ ⎞= + ⋅⎜ ⎟
⎝ ⎠
1 .r
c c                         
(15ss)
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There are 10 unknowns and 10 independent equations. The market 
clearing conditions (9) and (10) are reflected in (2ss) and (11ss). The 
market clearing condition (8), which is redundant because it is only 
the sum of (2) and (6), is not considered. The two equations (12sa) and 
(15sa) introduced early can be derived easily from (12ss) and (15ss). 
For analytical tractability and simplicity, we abstract from the deci- 
sions regarding labor supply and demand for the following Proposition 
1 and Proposition 2:8
Proposition 1. The steady state level of capital, household consumption, 
investment, and output increases in θ . However, the steady state level 
of entrepreneurial consumption changes in a non-linear way. That is, it 
increases in θ  for low values of θ  and decreases in θ  for high values of 
θ .
Proof. The steady state level of capital is solved as follows when we 
abstract from labor:
αα γ
θ δ β γ γ δ




1 (1 ) ( ) (1 )
zk
Thus, it follows that
α
αδ β γ α γ
θ α α γ θ δ β γ γ δ
−
−⎛ ⎞− ⋅ − ⋅ ⋅= ⋅ ⋅ >⎜ ⎟− ⋅ ⋅ − ⋅ − ⋅ − − ⋅ −⎝ ⎠
2
11 (1 ) ( ) 0.
1 1 (1 ) ( ) (1 )
dk z
d z
From the steady state relations, it is easy to see that
( ) ( )β δ θ
θ θ
′ ⎡ ⎤= − ⋅ − ⋅ + ⋅ >⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦




= ⋅ > 0,di dk
d d
8 Ignoring the labor-related variables does no critical harm to the propositions 
and to the subsequent discussions.
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αα
θ θ
−= ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ >1 0.dy dkz k
d d
Finally, from c＝y－c’－i,
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )αα θ β δ δ β δ
θ θ
−⎡ ⎤= ⋅ ⋅ − ⋅ − − − ⋅ − − ⋅ − ⋅⎣ ⎦
1 1 1 1 1 .dc dkz k k
d d
As the second term on the right-hand side of the above equation, －(1
－β )․(1－δ )․k, can be treated simply as a constant, dc/dθ is reduced 
to a linear function of dk/dθ with the slope of
[ ]
z k 1 (1 )(1 )
1 1 (1 )
αα θ β δ δ
γ θ β δ
γ
−⋅ ⋅ − ⋅ − − −
−= ⋅ − ⋅ ⋅ −













This implies that entrepreneurial consumption increases in θ for low 
values of θ and decreases in θ  for high values of θ. ■
High values of θ loosen the borrowing constraint and decrease the 
amount of downpayment required to buy a unit capital in the steady 
state. This may increase the benefit of being allowed to borrow more, 
λθ (1－δ ), which is the second term on the right-hand side of (13ss), 
and stimulate capital accumulation, resulting in high level of capital 
stock. The nonlinearity of consumption in Proposition 1 then implies 
that more than a desirable amount of economic resources may be 
devoted to capital accumulation for high enough values of θ while ag- 
gregate consumption shrinks.
Proposition 2. Compared with the unconstrained first-best economy, the 
credit-constrained economy exhibits under-investment for θ≤1. Over- 
investment can occur only under the condition that θ＞1 is allowed.
Proof. The steady-state capital stock in the unconstrained economy, 
ku, is given by9
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Note also that





Then it is straightforward that
ku－k＞0
if and only if 
1 1 (1 )or
(1 ) ( ) (1 )
γ δθ θ
β δ β γ δ
− ⋅ −< >
⋅ − − ⋅ −
 (under-investment)
9 In the unconstrained economy, because there is no borrowing limit, there is 
no need for any heterogeneity between agents that necessitates credit flow and 
borrowing limit. The unconstrained “first-best” economy is defined as a simple 
standard homogeneous agent model where the social planner maximizes the 










subject to the resource constraint in the period t : t t t t tc k k z k1 1(1 ) .
αδ − −+ + − ≤
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and ku－k＜0
if and only if 
1 1 (1 )
(1 ) ( ) (1 )
γ δθ
β δ β γ δ
− ⋅ −< <
⋅ − − ⋅ −
 (over-investment).
As β․(1－δ )＜1, the constrained economy with θ≤1 exhibits under- 
investment, and the constrained economy exhibiting over-investment 
should have θ strictly larger than 1. ■
For the entrepreneurs, there are two types of assets that they can 
choose to hold: capital and loan. The coexistence of both assets in 
equilibrium implies that the rates of return in holding these assets 
should be equivalent in an ex ante expected sense for each period. 
Furthermore, in the steady state, the rate of return on holding either 
asset should be strictly greater than the equilibrium interest rate.
Proposition 3. In the competitive equilibrium defined above, the rate-of- 
return equivalence between capital k and loan b should hold. Moreover, 
in the steady-state, the rate of return on these assets is strictly greater 
than the equilibrium interest rate.
Proof. From the first-order conditions (13) and (15), it is straight- 
forward that








≡ ⋅ ⎜ ⎟
⎝ ⎠












⋅ ⋅ −≡ + − + ⋅ , the return on capital, and  (20)
b t
t t t




≡ ⋅ + ⋅⎜ ⎟
⎝ ⎠
, the return on loan.           (21)
(12sa) and (15sa) imply that in the steady state, rate-of-return on loan 
becomes
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From (13ss), it is easy to see that in the steady state




β γ θ δα δ
γ
− − ⋅ ⋅ −⋅ + − =
Thus, the steady state rate-of-return on capital becomes
k cR 1 ( ) (1 ) (1 )
1 .
β γ θ δ θ δλ
γ γ
γ
− − ⋅ ⋅ − ⋅ −= + ⋅
=
Then from (12sa), it follows that
k bR R r1 1
γ β
= = > = . ■
In (20), the return on capital consists of two elements: the marginal 
product of capital net of depreciation and the term premultiplied by λ t, 
which is related to the discounted benefit of being permitted to borrow 
more. In the same vein, the return on loan in (21) does exceed the 
normal interest rate. This additional return indicates departure from 
the first-best allocation.
III. Numerical Experiments
In this section, the dynamic behaviors of the model economy are 
evaluated qualitatively through numerical experiments. We began with 
parametrization and then proceeded to solve the model to determine 
the recursive linear law of motions for endogenous variables expressed 
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in log-linear deviations from the steady state.10
The goal of the numerical exercises here is to explore the business 
cycle implications of leveraging against collateral. The questions to be 
answered are as follows: Is the leverage in collateral constraints irrel- 
evant or neutral to the business cycle characteristics? If not, how does 
it matter? More concretely, if two otherwise homogeneous macroeconomy 
differ only in the degree of leverage, how do the magnitudes of amplifi- 
cation and persistence in business fluctuations of these two economies 
differ? How are they affected by the different levels of financial lever- 
age? Answering these questions requires a comparative study. In this 
respect, the proper research strategy should focus on the differences in 
the key business cycle moments generated from the different values of 
θ, with other things being controlled to equal.
However, there is a caveat. Applying an abstract and oversimplified 
model to the issue at hand, such as the one in this paper, has both an 
advantage and a disadvantage: the former comes from its clarity in re- 
vealing dynamics, whereas the latter is its apparent lack of empirical 
flavor. The present model is too abstract that the numerical exercises 
based on it do not aim at direct data-matching quantifications per se. 
Instead, the main interest lies in examining its aggregate implications 
purely from the modeling perspective. This paper deals with whether 
and how the credit cycle model with the elements of leverage-in-the- 
collateral constraint improves the one without it.
A. Impulse-Response Analysis
A unit period is a quarter. Following the literature, the parameters β , 
γ, δ, and α  are set to have the values of 0.99, 0.95, 0.03, and 0.3, 
respectively, whereas the value of η  is set to be equal to 1.01 based on 
Iacoviello (2005). The source of shock is assumed to be represented by 
the change in zt, TFP, and the shock process is assumed to follow the 
AR(1) process of
t t tz z 1log logρ ε−= +                       (22)
where ε t~ i.i.d.N(1, σ
2). The impulse is defined as the 1% increase in zt 
from its steady-state value. The value of ρ  is assumed to be 0.95.11
10 The log-linearized equilibrium conditions are in the appendix. The MATLAB 
M-files (version 7.1) used in the experiments are available upon request.
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a) Investment as a Key Driver of Amplification
The positive productivity shock increases the marginal product of ca- 
pital, as evident in (4). This, in turn, increases the demand for capital, 
thus increasing investment. The responses of investments for different 
θ ’s, in terms of percent deviations from the steady state are given in 
Figure 2. To simplify and clarify the comparisons without loss of gen- 
erality, only the cases of θ＝0.5 and θ＝1.5 are presented. The case of 
θ＝1 is not presented because the results are mainly in between. In 
addition, the behaviors of the present constrained model can be con- 
trasted with those of the unconstrained one defined earlier, if needed.
Figure 2 shows that in the credit-constrained economy, the amount 
of investment in each period is limited by the borrowing capacity. When 
θ is larger, both borrowing capacity and investment are larger. As seen 
in Equation (13), one of the benefits of investment comes from being 
permitted to borrow more. With the level of financial leverage being high- 
er, the benefits from enlarging borrowing capacity due to the marginal 
increase in investment are bigger. Thus, larger θ  is associated with 































11 The calibrations for the basic parameters are based on the standard busi- 
ness cycle literature; thus, the details are not reproduced here. The present 
calibration yields the following consumption-to-output and investment-to-output 
ratios in the steady state for each value of θ ’s:
TABLE N1
STEADY-STATE PROPERTIES OF THE MODEL
The well-known sources for the long-run investment-to-output ratio from the 
data include Summers and Heston (1984) and Maddison (1992). The former 
reports that in the US, it amounts to 24%, whereas in Canada, it accounts for 
28% (for the period 1950-1980). The latter reports that, in the US, it amounts 
to 18.9% for the period of 1950-1969 and 18.7% for the period of 1970-1989. 
We can also compute the two long-run ratios in the data based on Cooley and 
Prescott (1994, p. 21), where the long-run investment-to-output and consumption- 
to-output ratios are about 25% and 75%, respectively. These indicate that the 
relevant values of θ ’s should range from 0.8-1.3 to be consistent with the pres- 
ent calibration. In addition, the table above reveals that in the steady state, the 
ratio of consumption-to-output shrinks and the ratio of investment-to-output 
expands when the value of θ  increases, confirming Proposition 1.
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FIGURE 2
RESPONSES OF INVESTMENTS
larger increases in investment, as evident in Figure 2.
Interestingly, limiting the amount of investment in the current period 
in accordance with (7b) appears to open the door for more persistent 
responses of investment. Figure 2 illustrates that investments “die out” 
more slowly with larger θ. However, the persistence generated upon 
itself does not seem to be quantitatively important. The economic in- 
tuitions behind the relationship between the degree of leverage and of 
persistence are also not clear when we consider investment only. The 
responses of investment do not appear to shed much light on the issues 
of persistence. More notably, the speed of returning to the steady state 
is much faster in case of higher leverage. If capital is accumulated faster 
during the period when TFP remains high after shock,12 then marginal 
product of capital also decreases faster. This, in turn, increases the 
speed of adjustment. Note in the figure that, initially, the gap between 
two constrained cases amounts to about 1%, but as time goes by the 
gap becomes negligible.
From the discussions above, it becomes clear that there is no need 
12 The assumed TFP shock is a one-off in the sense that there is a one-time 
increase in ε in (22). However, the positive effects of one-time increase in ε last 
for more than one period, as TFP changes according to (22).
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FIGURE 3
RESPONSES OF CAPITAL STOCK
to introduce the changes in the relative price of capital to explain the 
enlargement of borrowing capacity after a positive shock. In this respect, 
the two-way interaction is not an exclusive channel facilitating the credit 
cycle effects. Rather, borrowing capacity can be expanded as an endog- 
enous response to a positive shock consistently with the inter-temporal 
optimizing behaviors.
b) Consumption as a Key Driver of Persistence
Consumption, in nature, is deeply related to the issue of persistence 
than investment. The reason is that the amount of consumption in 
each period fluctuates in the process of intertemporal smoothing. Figure 
4 shows the responses of aggregate consumption, which is the sum of 
both household and entrepreneurial consumption.
Initially, after the positive shock, consumption expands with income. 
However, the initial responses are not as strong as those of income due 
to the increase in saving, namely, lending. Confronted with a positive 
shock, households allocate more resources to lending, rather than cur- 
rent consumption, to take advantage of higher productivity.
There are two different effects on the consumption of the positive 
TFP shock. These two work in opposite directions. First, consumption 
increases due to the income effect generated by higher TFP. At the 
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FIGURE 4
RESPONSES OF AGGREGATE CONSUMPTION
same time, the substitution effect works. The positive TFP shock in- 
creases the marginal product of capital, which in turn pushes up the 
interest rate in accordance with the rate-of-return equivalence arguments 
in Proposition 3. The intertemporal substitution in consumption thus 
occurs to decrease the current consumption. In the initial phase, the 
substitution effect is strong, shifting resources to lending rather than 
consumption. However, after the initial phase, the substitution effect 
becomes weaker as the interest rate goes back to its steady state level 
while the income effect becomes stronger for the time being due to the 
enlargement of productive capacity enabled by capital accumulation as 
in Figure 3. This reversal yields the hump-shaped or inverted U-shaped 
responses of consumption in Figure 4, thus the occurrence of persist- 
ence. It also seems evident from the figures that the lower the degree 
of financial leverage is, the larger the magnitude of aggregate consump- 
tion responses. This appeals to the intuition that the merit of increasing 
investment is smaller in the case of low leverage. Higher θ ’s yield a 
stronger substitution effect in the initial phase.
c) Summary: Effects of Leveraging on Amplification and Persistence
The responses of investment are in stark contrast with those of con- 
sumption to a positive TFP impulse. Investment responds much more 
strongly in magnitude than in consumption. In this regard, investment 
is a key driver of amplification. Consumption exhibits the hump-shaped 
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pattern and stronger persistence than investment, implying that con- 
sumption is more important in the issue of persistence.
To summarize the discussions above, the higher leverage facilitates 
stronger responses of investment and weaker responses of consumption. 
Thus, with higher leverage, the impact of shock is more amplified but 
does not last longer than with lower leverage. In other words, in a 
highly leveraged economy, the effects of the shock are likely to appear 
in amplified magnitudes but disappear more quickly. Higher leverage is 
likely to be associated with stronger amplification and weaker persist- 
ence. This “trade-off” is evident in Figure 5, which shows the responses 
of output for different θ ’s.13
B. Model Simulation
The cyclical behavior of the model economy is studied through simu- 
lations based on the shock process defined in (22). The aim is to com- 
pare the magnitudes of amplification and persistence in the present con- 
strained model with those in the unconstrained model or real data.
a) Parametrization of the Shock Process
Parameters ρ  and σ  in (22) are calibrated jointly in accordance with 
Cooley and Prescott (1994). Thus, the cyclical behaviors of the uncon- 
strained economy in this paper become close enough to those of the 
frictionless Cooley-Prescott economy.14 This enables us to regard the un- 
constrained economy safely in this paper as a meaningful benchmark.
From the simulations of the unconstrained model, σ should be 
around 0.54 when ρ  is 0.95, and σ  should be around 0.49 when ρ  is 
0.9 to mimic the Cooley-Prescott economy. With the combinations of 
(ρ , σ ) set to (0.95, 0.54) or (0.9, 0.49), the unconstrained economy be- 
13 In the literature, Song (2005) argues for the trade-off between persistence 
and amplification in a similar manner as this paper. However, the mechanism 
that generates the trade-off in his paper is not the same as that in this paper. 
Moreover, in Song (2005), the differences in the responses of consumption and 
investment are not considered at all. Additionally, his model is still based on 
the linearities. The readers can also refer to Mendicino (2008) with regard to the 
relationship between amplification and the value of θ . However, Mendicino 
(2008) did not consider the issue of persistence at all. Both Song (2005) and 
Mendicino (2008) ignored the endogenous motive for accumulating collateral 
assets and did not consider the case of θ＞1.
14 See Table 1.2 Cyclical Behavior of the Artificial Economy, p. 34 in Cooley 
and Prescott (1994).
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FIGURE 5
RESPONSES OF OUTPUT
SD% output investment consumption
Cooley-Prescott
sigma 0.54, rho 0.95











STANDARD DEVIATIONS (HP-FILTERED SERIES)
haves in a similar fashion as the Cooley-Prescott economy, as seen in 
Table 1 and Table 2.
b) Effects of Leveraging on Amplification 
To measure amplification, the standard deviation of the output is nat- 
urally the first candidate. In the data, the standard deviations of out- 
put, investment, and consumption for non-durables are known to be 
1.72, 8.24, and 0.86, respectively.15 These numbers seem huge relative 
15 See Table 1.1 Cyclical Behavior of the U.S. Economy, pp. 30-31 in Cooley 
and Prescott (1994).
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Classification Cross-Correlation of  Output with:
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unconst. 1.368  4.730 0.467 1.386 5.200 0.375 
DATA 1.72 8.24 0.86 1.72 8.24 0.86
TABLE 3
STANDARD DEVIATIONS (HP-FILTERED SERIES)
to the ones generated by the constrained models. Table 3 reports the 
results from the model simulations.
Consistent with the discussions so far, the volatility of output in- 
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creases in θ. However, only when θ  exceeds unity can the constrained 
model generate larger amplification compared with the unconstrained 
one. Furthermore, compared with real data, the constrained model can 
generate larger amplification only when θ exceeds around 1.4. These 
results may imply that if we assume θ≤1 as in the existing literature, 
then we cannot hope for any amplifying role of the collateral con- 
straints.
Another measure of amplification is the standard deviation of output 
divided by the standard deviation of TFP, σ y/σ z. This measure is 
proposed by Cordoba and Ripoll (2004a) and is applicable directly 
regardless of the volatility of underlying shocks because it is essentially 
standardized. Table 4 compares the results.
Except for the case where there is no autocorrelation of shocks shown 
in the last two columns, the amplification generated by the constrained 
model is not significant unless θ exceeds 1 by a large amount. Rather, 
the degrees of amplification or the values of σ y/σ z for the constrained 
models are smaller than that for the unconstrained model for small θ .
Kocherlakota (2000) shows that the amplification in the credit cycle 
model depends crucially on factor shares, and if capital share is small, 
then the amplification may become insignificant. Cordoba and Ripoll 
(2004a) claims that it is very difficult under standard preferences, tech- 
nologies, and parameter specifications to have the amplification similar 
to the typical RBC models.16 Seemingly, the results of the simulation 
studies in this paper also cast doubts on the amplifying role of collat- 
eral constraints.
However, the model presented in this paper can be argued to im- 
prove on Cordoba and Ripoll (2004a) in that the present one generates 
bigger and better amplification results. In their paper, similar to in 
Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), both lenders and borrowers are assumed to 
produce. Hence, only the productivity gap between them the shock is 
amplified, as properly documented by Pintus and Wen (2008). However, 
in the model equilibrium of this paper, only borrowers produce. This 
allows the shock to be amplified by the full capital share, yielding 
larger amplification than Cordoba and Ripoll (2004a).17
16 Cordoba and Ripoll (2004a) argue that, for example, when capital share is 
⅓ and the elasticity of intertemporal substitution is 1, then there is no am- 
plification.
17 In the literature, Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), Cordoba and Ripoll (2004a), 
and Mendicino (2008) assume that both lenders and borrowers produce, whereas 
Iacoviello (2005), Song (2005), and Pintus and Wen (2008) assumed that only 
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first-best 1.368 1.984  1.386 2.232  2.803 2.231  2.767 2.859  
C-R    　 　 　 3.365 1.467  1.532 1.532 
DATA σy= 1.72
c) Effects of Leveraging on Persistence
The degree of persistence can be measured in terms of the autocor- 
relations of output. The autocorrelations of the detrended output between 
the period t and t±1, t±2, t±3, and t±4 are 85%, 63%, 38%, and 16%, 
respectively.19 However, it is not known whether credit-constrained 
models can match these moments successfully. 
borrowers produce.
The models with financial accelerator, such as Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist 
(1999) can be argued to exhibit amplification results similar to the present paper. 
However, in the modeling perspectives, there are significant differences between 
the credit cycle models and financial accelerator models. In the former, credit 
frictions are introduced in the form of binding collateral constraints, whereas in 
the latter, they are due to the costly state verification problem. In the text, it is 
noted that the existing credit cycle models have thus far not been very success- 
ful in solving the so-called “small shocks, large cycles” puzzle. The present paper 
takes up this issue and reveals that “leverage-in-the-collateral-constraint” can 
be a candidate mechanism that generates amplification.
18 “First-best” stands for the unconstrained economy defined in footnote 9; it 
is calibrated in accordance with Cooley and Prescott (1994). “C-R” stands for 
the results reported in Cordoba and Ripoll (2004a), p. 1036.
19 See again Table 1.1 Cyclical Behavior of the U.S. Economy, pp. 30-31 in 
Cooley-Prescott (1994).
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FIGURE 6
AUTOCORRELATIONS OF OUTPUT (HP-FILTERED SERIES): σ＝0.54, ρ＝0.95
FIGURE 7
AUTOCORRELATIONS OF OUTPUT (HP-FILTERED SERIES): σ＝0.49, ρ＝0.9
Figures 6-8 present the relevant autocorrelations of the HP-filtered 
output. From these figures, the larger θ ’s are likely to be associated 
with smaller persistence. For θ＞1, collateral constraints seem to fail to 
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FIGURE 8
AUTOCORRELATIONS OF OUTPUT (HP-FILTERED SERIES): σ＝1, ρ＝0.9
generate persistence, in that serial correlations, when θ＞1, fall behind 
the ones in the unconstrained economy case. In contrast, for θ＜1, 
stronger persistence emerges. However, its quantitative significance ap- 
pears to be doubtful. It is only slightly stronger than in the uncon- 
strained economy case while still falling behind the real data with marked 
differences.20
20 According to Figure 1, the leverage ratio appears to have been in an 
increasing trend. However, the results of experiments and simulations reported 
in this paper do not argue that historically and as a matter of fact, amplifi- 
cation became bigger and persistence became smaller. Instead, they suggest a 
theoretically derived potential mechanism through which amplification and per- 
sistence may be affected. The present paper is a purely model-based one, and 
the numerical exercise here is not an empirical one but rather a qualitative the- 
oretical experimentation.
As discussed, the present paper aims to improve the existing credit cycle 
models from a modeling perspective to capture the non-neutral implications of 
financial leverage on business fluctuations. To this end, a new device, the mech- 
anism of “leverage-in-the-collateral constraint” is introduced into a computable 
variant of a credit cycle model. As a modeling research, this paper naturally 
and explicitly acknowledges not only the achievements but also the unresolved 
limitations and directions for future research. It is in this respect that the pres- 
ent study does not attempt to argue any definitive empirical implication.
To study the possibly related empirical issues, including the explanations   
on “the great moderation” and trends in the recent consumption-to-output/ 
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IV. Concluding Remarks
Building on the literature after Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), this paper 
presents a simple DSGE model where the credit cycle effects of finan- 
cial leverage are generated through the endogenous process of capital 
accumulation. The model in this paper sheds some light on the macro- 
economic consequences of a highly leveraged financial sector. The re- 
sults of the numerical exercises suggest that the degree of leverage mat- 
ters critically in amplifying the effects of collateral constraints. The more 
highly leveraged the economy is, the more amplified the impacts of 
shocks. The level of financial leverage may affect real economy in non- 
neutral ways in the course of business fluctuations, suggesting that an 
economy in recession may experience more severe contractions if it is 
highly leveraged.
Generating both significant amplification and significant persistence 
at the same time with the leverage-in-the-collateral constraint mecha- 
nism alone is found to be considerably difficult. The trade-off between 
amplification and persistence emerges. The impulse-response analyses 
in this paper indicate that the fundamental cause of this trade-off lies 
in the differences in the response patterns of investment and consump- 
tion, which reflect the intertemporal optimizing behaviors of the forward- 
looking rational agents. How could this trade-off be resolved or miti- 
gated? For now, it seems that the performance of the present model 
may possibly be enhanced with regard to the persistence issue if the 
elements of habit formation are added to the present model. Naturally, 
this will be the next task in future research.
(Received 21 Feburary 2010; Revised 24 July 2010; Accepted 26 July 
2010)
investment-to-output ratios, we need to apply structural estimations for the mod- 
els equipped with more realistic features than the model in this paper in order 
to isolate the effects of the variables of interest properly. The model in this 
paper is not adequate for this purpose at all because it is designed in its form 
to be as simple as possible to highlight the subject of this paper. This can be 
an apparent limitation of the present model.
   BUSINESS CYCLES AND LEVERAGE IN COLLATERAL CONSTRAINTS 523
Appendix 1: The Model
A1.1 The Steady State
The steady state of the model economy is solved analytically. First, 
as already noted in the text, (12sa) and (16) can be derived easily from 
(12ss) and (15ss).
From (13ss), it follows that
( ) ( )y
k
1 1 1αγ δ θ δ β γ⋅⎛ ⎞= ⋅ + − + − −⎜ ⎟
⎝ ⎠
⇒ k＝εky․y                                      (A1)
                     where ( ) ( ) ( )ky 1 1 1
γ με
γ δ θ δ β γ
⋅≡
− − − − −
Then from (5ss)
kyi y,δ ε= ⋅ ⋅                        (A2)
from (7ss)
kyb y(1 ) ,β θ δ ε= ⋅ ⋅ − ⋅ ⋅                    (A3)
from (6ss) and (14ss)
ky kyc k y y y(1 ) (1 )δ θ δ ε α β θ δ ε+ ⋅ + ⋅ − ⋅ ⋅ = ⋅ + ⋅ ⋅ − ⋅ ⋅
⇒ c＝εcy․y                                              (A4)







                           (A5)
from (2ss)
kyc y y(1 ) (1 ) (1 )α β θ δ ε′ = − ⋅ + − ⋅ ⋅ − ⋅ ⋅
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⇒ c’＝εc’y․y                                      (A6)
     where c y ky1 (1 ) (1 ).ε α ε β θ δ′ ≡ − + − ⋅ ⋅ −
As the following holds from (11ss) and (14ss)
c y l(1 ) ,ηα −′ = − ⋅ ⋅
it should be that
c y y y l(1 )
ηε α −′ ⋅ = − ⋅ ⋅
(A7)








′⎛ ⎞⇒ = ⎜ ⎟−⎝ ⎠
and thus from (14ss),





















′⎡ ⎤= ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⎢ ⎥−⎣ ⎦
  (A9)
                   











⎡ ⎤⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥⇒ = ⋅ ⋅ ⎢ ⎥−⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦⎣ ⎦
Equations (A1)-(A6) and (A8) express the variables k, i, b, c, λ , c’, 
and w as functions of y, respectively. Each of the Equations (12sa), 
(A7), and (A9) gives r, l, and y, respectively. 
A1.2 Model Dynamics in Log Linear Deviations from the Steady 
State
The endogenous variables are {kt, yt, ct, ct’, it, lt, bt, rt, wt, λ t}. The 
equilibrium conditions are given by (4), (5), (6), (7b), (8), (11), (12), (13), 
(14), and (15). To explore the dynamics of the model economy, these 
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equations are log-linearized around the steady state as follows, where 
the variables with hat denote the percentage deviations from their steady 
state values. In log-linearizing the expectational equations, the distribu- 
tional log-normality and conditional homoskedasticity are assumed.
t t t ty z k l1ˆ ˆˆ ˆ (1 ) 0α α−− − ⋅ − − ⋅ =                  (4LL)
t t tk k i1ˆ ˆ ˆ(1 ) 0δ δ−− − ⋅ − ⋅ =                    (5LL)
t t t t t tc c i i y w l y r b r b b b1 1ˆ ˆ ˆˆ ˆ ˆ( ) ( ) 0− −⋅ + ⋅ − − ⋅ ⋅ + ⋅ ⋅ + − ⋅ =       (6LL)
( ) ( )t t tr b r b k kˆ ˆˆ 1 0δθ
⋅ ⋅ + − − ⋅ ⋅ =
                (7LL)
t t t ty y c c c c i îˆ ˆ ˆ 0′ ′− ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ =                  (8LL)
t t tl y cˆ ˆ ˆ 0η ′⋅ − + =                      (11LL)
t t t tE c c r1ˆ ˆ ˆ 0+′ ′− − =                     (12LL)
t t tc c c ct 1 ˆˆ ˆ{ (1 ) 1} E (1 )λ θ δ λ θ δ λ++ ⋅ ⋅ − − ⋅ + ⋅ ⋅ − ⋅
      (13LL)
t tc y kt 1 ˆˆ{1 (1 ) (1 )} (E ) 0δ γ λ θ δ ++ − − ⋅ − ⋅ ⋅ − ⋅ − =
t t tw l yˆˆ ˆ 0+ − =                       (14LL)
t t t t tc E c r1 ˆˆ ˆ ˆ( ) 0β γ β γ λ β+⋅ − ⋅ + − ⋅ + ⋅ =            (15LL)




Cross-Correlation of Output with:





















































rho 0.95 Standard 
deviations
Cross-Correlation of Output with:
Unconstrained 
economy






























































































































































































































































































































Appendix 2: Simulation Results
A2.1 Data [Cooley and Prescott (1994)]
A2.2 Moments based on Model Simulations (HP-filtered series): 
σ＝0.54, ρ＝0.95
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sigma 0.49, rho 0.9
Standard 
deviations
Cross-Correlation of Output with:
Unconstrained 
economy
































































































































































rho 0.95 Standard 
deviations
Cross-Correlation of Output with:









































































































































































































































































A2.3 Moments based on Model Simulations (HP-filtered series): 
σ＝0.49, ρ＝0.9
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sigma 0.49, rho 0.9 Standard 
deviations
Cross-Correlation of Output with:
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sigma 1, rho 0.9
Standard 
deviations
Cross-Correlation of Output with:
Unconstrained 
economy








































































































































































































































































































































































































































A2.4 Moments based on Model Simulations (HP-filtered series): 
σ＝1, ρ＝0.9
SEOUL JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS530
sigma 1, rho 0
Standard 
deviations
Cross-Correlation of Output with:
Unconstrained 
economy









































































































































































































































































sigma 1, rho 0.9 Standard 
deviations
Cross-Correlation of Output with:































































































































































A2.5 Moments based on Model Simulations (HP-filtered series): 
σ＝1, ρ＝0
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sigma 1, rho 0 Standard 
deviations
Cross-Correlation of Output with:
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